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| TITLE | SUMMARY | TOPIC(S) |
| Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) | An Oklahoma statute allowing the state to use compulsory sterilization as punishment for certain types of crimes was found to be unconstitutional. The Court held that when applied only to certain categories of crimes, punitive sterilization under the state statute violated the Equal Protection Clause. | Forced Sterilization |
| Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) | A Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was challenged on the grounds that it violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court found that in the 3/4 of a century the law had been on the books it had never been enforced, so the immediacy that is necessary for constitutional adjudication was lacking and the court declined to rule on the law. | Contraception |
| Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) | A Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives was found to be unconstitutional. The Court held that the Constitution contains a "right to privacy" that protects the decision of married couples to use contraceptives. | Contraception |
| Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) | A Texas law prohibiting abortions except to save the woman’s life was found unconstitutional. The Court held that the constitutional right to privacy extends to the decision of a woman to terminate her pregnancy. The Court established the trimester framework for abortion regulation: during the first trimester of pregnancy, the decision may be made free from state interference. After the first trimester, the state has a compelling interest in protecting the woman’s health and may reasonably regulate abortion to promote that interest. After the point of fetal viability (generally during the third trimester), the state has a compelling interest in protecting potential life and may ban abortion, except when necessary to preserve the woman’s life or health. | Abortion |
| Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) | Conviction of a non-physician for performing abortions was upheld. The Court held that States may require that only physicians provide abortions; such a regulation provides the minimum standard of safety upon which the constitutional right recognized in Roe was predicated. | |
| Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) | A Missouri law requiring parental consent for a minor’s abortion, spousal consent for a married woman’s abortion, and prohibiting second-trimester abortion by saline amniocentesis was found unconstitutional. The Court held that parental and spousal consent requirements are unlawful because they delegate to third parties an absolute veto power over a woman’s abortion decision that even the state does not possess. The ban on saline amniocentesis was struck down by the Court because it was the most commonly used method of second-trimester abortion at the time, and was shown to be less dangerous to the woman’s health than other available methods; the choice of method must be left to the physician. The law also required the woman’s written informed consent, as well as certain record keeping and reporting restrictions for abortion providers, which were both upheld as constitutional. | Minors |
| Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) | Two women brought this action attacking the validity of a Connecticut welfare regulation that limited state Medicaid benefits for abortions to those that are medically necessary. Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause did not require a state to cover the cost of "nontherapeutic" abortions for low-income women. | State/Federal Funding |
| Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) | Massachusetts law regulating a minor’s ability to obtain judicial bypass was found unconstitutional. The Court held that all minors must have an opportunity to approach a judge without first having to consult and be refused by their parents, and the proceedings must be confidential and expeditious. Also, a mature minor must be given permission for an abortion, regardless of the judge’s view as to her best interests, and an immature minor must be permitted to have a confidential abortion, if the abortion is in her best interests. | Minors |
| Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) | Action was brought challenging the validity of the Hyde Amendment, which severely limits use of federal funds to reimburse cost of abortions under the Medicaid program. The Supreme Court held that a state which participates in the Medicaid program is not obligated to fund medically necessary abortions for which federal reimbursement was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment; (2) funding restrictions of the Hyde Amendment does not violate the Fifth Amendment. Essentially, this case concludes that the Hyde Amendment is constitutional. | State/Federal Funding |
| Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983) | The Court held that an Ohio city ordinance requiring a 24-hour waiting period and physician counseling serves neither the state’s interest in protecting the woman’s health nor in ensuring her informed consent. They also held that requiring all abortions after the first trimester of pregnancy to be performed in full-service hospitals interferes with a woman’s access to abortion services without protecting her health because the dilatation and evacuation (D&E) method of mid-trimester abortion may be performed as safely in out-patient facilities as in full-service hospitals. A provision requiring minors under fifteen have parental or judicial consent for an abortion was also found unconstitutional for failing to guarantee an adequate judicial alternative to parental involvement. | Minors |
| Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) | Biological father disputes the adoption of his child by biological mother’s new husband. Although this case does not directly involve Alternative Reproduction, many adoption cases are used in ART cases by analogy. | Assisted Reproductive Technology |
| Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985) | Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that plaintiffs, parents of a stillborn child who died as a result of injuries suffered in utero, may bring a wrongful death suit against the mother’s obstetricians. | Fetal Rights |
| In the Matter of D.K., 497 A.2d 1298 (1985) | Court holds the appointment of a guardian for the fetus, at a time when the mother was only eight to ten weeks pregnant and the fetus could not have been viable, was unconstitutional and void. | Fetal Rights |
| Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386 (1986) | Child in this case was conceived by artificial insemination with semen donated personally to the mother by plaintiff donor. Trial court held 1) the known sperm donor was the child’s legal father and granted 2) sole legal and physical custody to the mother, visitation rights to donor. Court of Appeals affirms. | Assisted Reproductive Technology |
| Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) | The Court held that Pennsylvania’s 1982 Abortion Control Act was unconstitutional. Requiring that a woman be given specific information before she has an abortion, including state-produced printed materials describing the fetus was held invalid because it interferes with the physician’s discretion and requires a woman to be given information designed to dissuade her from having an abortion. Restricting post-viability abortion methods to maximize fetal survival was also invalid because it requires the woman to bear an increased risk to her health. The Court also rejected the detailed reporting requirements because they could lead to disclosure of the woman’s identity. | Informed Consent |
| Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) | In this challenge to Missouri legislation, the Court allowed a declaration that life begins at conception to go into effect because the majority agreed that there was insufficient evidence that it would be used to restrict protected activities such as choices of contraception or abortion. The Court also upheld the provision that barred the use of public facilities for abortions not necessary to save a woman’s life, by ruling that the state may implement a policy favoring childbirth over abortion through allocation of public resources such as hospitals and medical staff. Finally, the Court upheld the provision requiring viability tests be performed on fetuses after 20 weeks gestational age by interpreting it not to require tests that would be "imprudent" or "careless" to perform. | Viability |
| State v. Merrill, 450 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) | Supreme Court of Minnesota upholds two "unborn child" homicide statutes, holding (1) unborn child homicide statutes do not deny equal protection, and (2) statutes are not unconstitutionally vague. J. Simonett argues that the person who murders a fetus without a pregnant woman’s consent and the woman who elects to have an abortion are not similarly situated; thus, the statutes do not interfere with a woman’s constitutional right to privacy. | Fetal Rights |
| Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) | Recipients of family planning funds under Title X file an action challenging regulations which prohibit Title X recipients from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning. Supreme Court upheld the regulations, determining the regulations do not violate free speech rights and do not violate a woman’s right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy. | State/Federal Funding |
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) | Upon a challenge of Pennsylvania law, the Court reaffirmed the validity of a woman’s right to abortion under Roe, but announced a more restrictive standard of review that would now allow regulation of abortion prior to fetal viability so long as it does not constitute an "undue burden" to the woman. A restriction is an "undue burden" when it has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The provisions of Pennsylvania’s renewed Abortion Control Act required that, except in medical emergencies: (a) a woman wait 24 hours between consenting to and receiving an abortion; (b) the woman be given state-mandated information about abortion and offered state-authored materials on fetal development; (c) a married woman inform her husband of her intent to have an abortion; and (d) minors’ abortions be conditioned upon the consent, provided in person at the clinic, of one parent or guardian, or upon a judicial waiver. In addition, physicians and clinics that perform abortions were required to provide to the state annual statistical reports on abortions performed during the year, including the names of referring physicians. Under the new judicial standard, only the husband notification provision was considered an undue burden and therefore unconstitutional. All the other provisions were upheld as not unduly burdensome. | Abortion |
| Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 753 (1993) | Anti-abortion demonstrators challenged an injunction filed against them that prevented their blocking access to health care facilities. The injunction was based on an 1871 civil rights statute that forbid private conspiracy to violate constitutional rights. The Court held that the demonstrators’ impact on the constitutional right of women to receive abortion services did not violate the civil rights statute because their actions were not motivated by class-based discrimination against women, as the statute required, but by their opposition to abortion. | Anti-choice Protesting |
| Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 5753 (1994) | An injunction was issued against anti-abortion protestors prohibiting them from demonstrating within 36 feet of reproductive health clinic property lines or making noise and visual displays that could be heard and seen inside of clinics, and preventing them from approaching any person seeking services within 300 feet of clinics, unless the person indicated a desire to communicate. On appeal, the Court upheld the injunction, ruling that the 36-foot buffer zone protecting clinic entrances and driveways was a content-neutral measure, and did not infringe on the First Amendment rights of abortion protestors, as they had argued, and that the ban on disruptive noise was also constitutional. However, the Court limited the scope of its ruling by striking portions of the injunction as broader than necessary to protect the state’s interests, including the 300-foot no approach zone and the prohibition against "images observable to" patients inside the clinic. | Anti-choice Protesting |
| People v. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (1994) | California Supreme Court holds that fetal viability is not required for the crime of fetal murder, so long as the state can show that the fetus has progressed beyond the embryonic stage of seven to eight weeks. | Fetal Rights |
| Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York, 519 U.S. 357 (1997) | After a First Amendment challenge to an injunction aimed at anti-abortion protestors, the Court ruled that government interests in ensuring public safety and protecting a woman’s freedom to seek pregnancy-related services justify properly tailored injunctions to secure unimpeded physical access to health care clinics. The Court upheld the "fixed" buffer zone mandated by the injunction as necessary to ensure safe access to the clinics in light of the demonstrators’ previous behavior. Although, the Court did strike down as unconstitutional the "floating buffer zone" also included in the injunction because it burdened more speech than was necessary to achieve the government interest. | Anti-choice Protesting |
| Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) | For a number of reasons, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a Colorado law requiring clinic demonstrators to request permission before knowingly coming within eight feet of individuals seeking access to a healthcare facility. In its decision, the Court ruled that the statute did not violate the First Amendment because it did not regulate speech on the basis of content or viewpoint. The Court also reasoned that (1) the eight-foot distance of separation required by the statute would not adversely affect the regulated speech because this is a normal conversational distance; (2) because the statute only bans "approaches," protesters are not liable if they stand still and others come within eight feet of them; and (3) the protester must "knowingly" approach, and the "knowingly" requirement protects against accidentally or unavoidably coming within eight feet of someone who is in motion. | Anti-choice Protesting |
| Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) | In this case, the Supreme Court struck down the so-called “Partial Birth” Abortion Ban passed in Nebraska. The Court deemed the law unconstitutional because it did not have an exception for maternal health. Additionally, the Court ruled the Nebraska law created an undue burden on a woman’s right to abortion because the statute was written so broadly that it had the effect of outlawing almost all surgical abortions, including D&E, the safest and most commonly used method for performing second-trimester abortions. | "Partial-Birth" Abortion Bans |
| Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) | A "Search and Arrest" policy in place at a South Carolina hospital since 1989 was found to be unconstitutional. Under the policy, medical personnel would secretly search a targeted group of pregnant women for evidence of cocaine use without a warrant or consent, and then report results to the police who would arrest the women while still pregnant or immediately after giving birth in the hospital. The Court determined that the searches, which were conducted without warrants or probable cause, violated the Fourth Amendment, and did not meet any of the "special needs" asserted by the police. | Rights of Pregnant Woman |
| Lewis v. Thompson, 252 F.3d 567 (2001) | Action challenging the denial Medicaid coverage for routine prenatal care to pregnant, noncitizens under the Welfare Reform Act. Court held: (1) The Welfare Reform Act’s denial of prenatal care to unqualified aliens did not violate equal protection, but (2) denial of eligibility for Medicaid coverage to aliens’ born citizen children violated equal protection. | State/Federal Funding |
| Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261 (2002) | Dispute over two cryopreserved (known as "frozen") preembryos that were formed by husband’s sperm and donated eggs. Court holds that under the contract, husband and wife had to petition court for instructions when they were unable to reach mutual decision regarding disposition of preembryos upon dissolution of their marriage. | Assisted Reproductive Technology |
| Benitez v. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc., 106 Cal. App. 4th 978 (2003) | Benitez, an Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) plan participant, brought an action based on state law claims against her doctors and their employer, alleging defendants refused to provide her with alternative reproduction treatments because of her sexual orientation. Court held that ERISA did not preempt plaintiff’s state law claims. | Assisted Reproductive Technology; LGBTQ/Queer Reproductive Rights |
| Humphreys v. Clinic for Women, Inc., 796 N.E.2d 247 (2003) | Medical clinic and doctors challenged state statutes and regulations governing Indiana’s Medicaid program, alleging that restrictions on funding of abortions violated the Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of the State Constitution. Indiana Supreme Court held that: (1) state statutes did not violate Equal Privileges and Immunities Clause of State Constitution, but (2) under such Clause, the program had to pay for abortions in cases of pregnancies that created serious health risks for the pregnant woman. | State/Federal Funding |
| Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) | A Texas law prohibiting homosexual sodomy was struck down by the Court as unconstitutional. The Court held that the law violated the right of adults to engage in private intimate conduct, ruling that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. | Right to Privacy |
| Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, 537 U.S. 393 (2003) | After the Supreme Court held that RICO could be used to prosecute anti-abortion groups in 1994, on appeal the Court reversed, finding that because defendants did not acquire the property rights of victims, their actions did not constitute extortion. Because the Court found that the protestors had committed coercion, which is not covered under RICO, rather than extortion, RICO could not be used to criminally prosecute the violent protestors. | Anti-choice Protesting |
| Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England, 546 U.S. (2006) | A New Hampshire law that required a parent be notified 48 hours before an abortion is provided to a minor was found by the lower federal courts to be unconstitutional because it did not permit an immediate abortion without notifying a parent in medical emergencies that threaten the minor’s health. The Supreme Court affirmed the reasoning of the lower court, but remanded the case to determine whether a more limited injunction could remedy the unconstitutional applications of the statute, rather than invalidating the entire parental notification statute. The Court held that the lower courts might have gone too far in enjoining the whole parental notice law rather than just its application to medical emergency situations. | Minors |
| Gonzales v. Carhart and Gonzales v. PPFA, Inc., 546 U.S. 220 (2007) | The Supreme Court upheld the Federal "Partial-Birth" Abortion Ban, which bans procedures referred to as D&E and D&X. The ban does not contain an exception for the pregnant woman’s health. | "Partial-Birth" Abortion Bans |
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